Cutting Off BBC Feed Opens Debate on Sinosat Platform

BEIJING --- Six months after the launch of the new state controlled Sinosat-2 platform, the government’s decision earlier this month to temporarily take BBC World off air, one of the few European broadcasters on the new platform, comes as a confirmation of international media companies’ worst fears: that joining the new platform means abiding by strict censorship and tight government control.

Until recently, the 27 foreign channels with broadcasting rights in China were granted distribution rights in three-star and above hotels, foreign compounds as well as selected academic institutions. Although far from being an ideal situation for foreign broadcasters who ultimately aim at reaching the Chinese masses, the system enabled them to have some limited communication with their viewers.

The government decision late last year to launch a new satellite platform on which all foreign channels would be centralised, provoked a huge controversy among international media players in China. Protests were made against both the steep cost of the project for foreign broadcasters (the new platform reportedly costs each channel US$100,000 a year) and the lack of control over distribution and fears of increased censorship.

These fears were recently inflamed when the government decided to black out BBC World Service Television's programmes after it showed a demonstration in Hongkong against Beijing's crackdown on the banned Falun Gong spiritual group on the fifth anniversary of Hongkong's return to Chinese rule.

In an attempt to justify the government’s decision to take the BBC off air, Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said that the BBC had "violated an agreement" with China International TV Corp (CITV), which monopolises distribution of foreign channels.  Following a high level BBC visit to Beijing, the service was put back on air a few days later, without public explanation as to what had been agreed between the U.K. broadcaster and the Chinese authorities.

Beijing's sensitivity over Falun Gong was highlighted in recent weeks in a propaganda campaign that blamed the group for a series of hijackings of the government's Sinosat-1 satellite which disrupted TV transmissions from June 23 to 30 and scrapped plans for a live broadcast of a speech by President Jiang Zemin (CMM passim). The temporary closure in early July of trading on the Shenzhen stock exchange after interference with its satellite data links has also heightened worries within China about the security of its satellites

However, once the international outcry over the BBC incident subsides, it will be interesting to look at the significance of the government’s decision to black out the BBC feed. In practical terms, when the government switches off the BBC World transmission from the state-owned satellite (Sinosat), it does not prevent the BBC signal from being beamed into China via three satellites owned by PanAmSat Corp.

This consideration gives rise to another question: how effectively have the technical measures linked to the new Sinosat platform been implemented? In the post-Sinosat era, foreign compounds and luxury hotels are required to change their set-top-boxes in order to receive the new Sinosat signal. This operation is costly and there is so far no clear understanding on whether the government will in any way help cover migration costs.

In Beijing at least, top-end hotels claim that they have made the required changes, but random checks into channel availability in hotels and compounds seem to indicate that some of the available channels are not on the platform, while some channels on the platform are not available. Although, in Shanghai at least, the government did initially ensure that migration measures were undertaken, the situation currently seems to have come to a stand still.

Focusing on the BBC incident one wonders what the real government motivation was in blacking out BBC transmissions. How did this really affect BBC viewers in China? Through Sinosat, according to a license it was given in January last year, the BBC can be seen in about 60,000 three- to five-star hotel rooms in China. It is unclear how may still have access to the BBC through the PanAmSat feeds.

In any case, given the large proportion of Chinese who do not have access to the BBC through either system, China may not have been primarily motivated by a wish to protect its own domestic audience from harmful foreign influences.

Seen against a wider political context, this recent incident looks like traditional tactics by the Chinese government in occasionally handing out punishments as a veiled warning to the entire foreign media corps. China tends to be particularly sensitive to foreign media attention ahead of big political events such as this autumn’s 16th party Congress, which will most likely bring leadership changes, and the BBC is a favourite international target.

China's current leader, Jiang Zemin, is widely expected to step down as Secretary General of the Communist Party and State President, handing both positions to current Vice President Hu Jintao although recent reports suggest the succession is yet to be confirmed.

As a new power constellation is determined in Beijing, more curbs could be imposed and more sanctions handed out. In the months leading up to political changes, Beijing wants to insure that foreign media are warned about the consequences of any critical reporting about their leadership and plans of succession.

Another recent example of this policy was the government’s decision in June to ban the distribution of an issue of the U.K.-based magazine “The Economist”, which argued that political reform was needed in China. Again, given the very limited circulation of these magazines in the mainland and their predominantly foreign readership, this decision is to be seen as a symbolic gesture more than an effective policy.

As for the consequences these measures will have on international media investors’ confidence, China might be underestimating the gravity of the repercussions.

As Beijing struggles to prove its detractors wrong in the wake of its accession to WTO and embarks on its own version of the “sunshine policy”, these measures will be seen as confirmation that China is not willing to play by international rules and that any investment in its media industry is no more than dubious gambling. Although determined to keep a tight grip on the media industry, China is also eager to attract sufficient levels of foreign investment, a balancing act that might prove to become increasingly difficult.

Six months after the new platform’s launch, all these questions remain unanswered. Technical issues also remain at the core of the controversy, adding to the complexity of the situation and the difficulty of assessing the new platform’s reach.

Looking forward, China will have to prove that BBC incident is a one-off event aimed at both the state’s public enemy number one, the Falun Gong, and the conservative factions of the country’s political establishment ahead of the 16th party Congress. It will also have to ensure that hacking of the new platform becomes, if not impossible, at least much more difficult.

However the story develops, it is hard to see how the BBC decision to pay for distribution by Chinese authorities can be expected to co-exist with its principles of editorial independence. What chance is there that Sinosat will fail when, in the aftermath of the BBC incident, foreign satellite channels that are currently not on the platform, such as Germany’s DW or Italy’s Rai, are less likely than ever to want to join.